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WHEN WILL MY TROUBLES END? THE LOSS
IN PROGRESS DEFENSE IN PROGRESSIVE
LOSS INSURANCE CASES
Richard L. Antognini*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most general liability insurance policies only provide coverage when
the claimant sustains bodily injury or property damage covered by the
insured's policy while the policy is in force.' In the simplest of cases,
* Richard L. Antognini, A.B., 1974, University of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1977,
University of California, Hastings College of Law. The author is a partner in the Los Angeles
office of Arter, Hadden, Lawler, Felix & Hall, where he specializes in insurance coverage anal-
ysis and insurance litigation. The author would like to thank Howard S. Josephson of the
National Union Fire Insurance Company for his help in making this Article possible, and Jaye
Kapulsky, who did an outstanding job typing far too many drafts of this manuscript.
1. Several insurance terms should be understood at the outset. "First party" insurance
protects the insured when the insured's own person or property has been injured. "Casualty"
or "liability" insurance protects the insured against claims made by third parties alleging that
the insured's actions have injured them or damaged their property. Garvey v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2, 770 P.2d 704, 705 n.2, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 n.2
(1989). This Article primarily addresses issues arising in casualty or liability insurance.
One form of liability insurance is "comprehensive general liability" (CGL) insurance,
which protects the insured against liability claims for bodily injury or property damage to
third parties. Comprehensive liability policies arose in the 1940s and replaced policies that
insured only against specifically enumerated hazards. Other types of comprehensive liability
insurance policies in use throughout the insurance industry are comprehensive automobile lia-
bility policies, comprehensive personal liability policies, farmer's comprehensive personal lia-
bility policies, storekeeper's liability policies and hybrid liability policies. PROPERTY AND
LIABILrrY INSURANCE HANDBOOK 493-94 (John D. Long & Davis W. Gregg eds., 1965).
The insuring grant of a typical CGL policy states that the insurer will pay for third party
bodily injury or property damage claims that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay due
to an "occurrence" as defined in the policy. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 1628, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434 (1990). An occurrence is an acci-
dent, including exposure to conditions, which results in injury or damage not expected or
intended by the insured during the policy period. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
667 F.2d 1034, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
CGL policies provide coverage only when the claimant sustains bodily injury or property
damage while the policy is in force. Abex Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119, 121
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Typically, this requirement is found in a policy's definition of "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage." For example, a standard definition of "property damage" is:
"(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy pe-
riod, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of
tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed if caused by an occur-
rence during the policy period." Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388,
1391 n.1, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 279 n.1 (1988) (emphasis added).
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such as automobile accidents, the insured2 and insurer can easily deter-
mine when the claimant sustained injury; injury is suffered when the ac-
cident occurs. However, in cases involving progressive losses where
damage is not immediately apparent or detected and becomes worse over
time,3 establishing the date of injury or loss is rarely so simple. Fixing
that date has been a particularly troublesome and disputed issue in pro-
gressive loss cases involving asbestos,4 construction defects' and pollu-
2. An insured is "[t]he person who obtains or is otherwise covered by insurance on his
health, life, or property. The 'insured' in a policy is not limited to the insured named... but
applies to anyone who is insured under the policy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (6th ed.
1990).
3. See, eg., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 693, 798
P.2d 1230, 1242-43, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 399 (1990). In that case, the insurer had provided
first party property coverage for the owners of an apartment building in San Diego, California.
Id. at 679-80, 798 P.2d at 1233, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 390. Soil subsidence had caused large cracks
in the building's foundation and floor slabs over several years, but carpeting had hidden the
cracks. Id. at 680-81, 798 P.2d at 1233-34, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
4. See, eg., Keene Corp., 667 F.2d 1034. In cases involving asbestos-related disease, in-
halation-the occurrence that causes the injury-takes place substantially before manifestation
of the ultimate injury, whether asbestosis, mesothelioma or lung cancer. Id. at 1040. Inhala-
tion may continue over several policy periods, the disease may develop during subsequent
policy periods, and manifestation of the ultimate injury may occur in yet another policy pe-
riod. Id. In such cases, different insurers are likely to insure the risk at different points in the
development of each plaintiff's disease. Id.
Courts consider at least two theories in determining when coverage is triggered. The
exposure theory states that coverage is triggered at the time or times the claimant was exposed
to the asbestos-containing product. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp.
110, 114 (D. Mass. 1981). The manifestation theory states that coverage is triggered when the
asbestos-related disease first manifests itself by discoverable signs or symptoms. Id. The
theory chosen by a court is important because manifestation of an asbestos-related disease can
occur as long as twenty years after the initial exposure. Id. at 115. The court in Keene Corp.
rejected both the manifestation and exposure theories as the sole basis of liability and held that
coverage was triggered by both exposure and manifestation. 667 F.2d at 1041.
5. See eg., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d
1621, 1630, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 435 (1990) (involving coverage for "patching" work on hotel
in San Diego). "Patching" is the process of using a patching compound to fill holes in walls.
The compound failed and cracked and spalled off the walls. Id. at 1624, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 432;
see also Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1988) (involving misapplication of concrete and plaster to hotel insured under first party
property policy).
Since latent construction defects may not manifest themselves until a later successive pol-
icy period, the obligation to cover the loss can potentially shift to a different insurer. Id. at
1390, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 278. For example, in Home Insurance Co. the claim involved damage
to the Hotel del Coronado in San Diego caused by the application of concrete and plaster to
the hotel. Id. The key to imposing liability on a specific carrier was whether there had been an
occurrence within the policy period. Id. at 1392-93, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280. An occurrence was
defined in the policy as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the Insured." Id. at 1390 n.1, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 278 n.1. Thus, to determine
whether there had been an occurrence within the meaning of the policy, fixing the date of
injury was critical.
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tion6 claims because they frequently involve injuries that become
progressively worse over time, while remaining undetected for years.7
Progressive losses can also arise in product liability claims' and even in
claims for patent infringement.9 Because most general liability policies
only cover personal injury or property damage that occurs during the
policy period, fixing the date of injury is critical.
Courts have struggled for years with the problem of fixing dates of
injury in progressive loss cases to determine which insurer, if any, is re-
quired to pay for the loss."° While courts usually attempt to determine
6. See, e.g., Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987). In Industrial Steel Container Co. a company disposed of toxic waste in
a landfill during the 1970s. Id. at 157-58. Over the years the surrounding soil and ground-
water absorbed the toxic chemicals. Id. at 158. The defendant insurance companies fought
any liability for the toxic chemical clean-up arguing that there had been no occurrence of
property damage yet. Id. They contended that because the toxic waste was added to the
landfill only in the early 1970s, and their policies were in effect from 1982 to 1984, there could
not have been an occurrence of property damage caused by the toxic waste during the periods
of their coverage. Id. at 157-58.
Although the contamination initially manifested itself before these policies became effec-
tive, the leakage continued during these policy periods, resulting in continued manifestation of
actual injury. Id. at 159-60. The court held that there can be damage with more than one
manifestation in cases of exposure to toxic substances. Id. at 159. The court, therefore, re-
jected the argument that there can be only one occurrence in a case where damage results from
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions. Id. at 159-60.
7. See, eg., Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974). In this progressive loss case, a building owner sued the building's general contractor
after finding dry rot in the building. Id. at 429. The dry rot was caused by dirt piled against
the box sills of the building when it was built in 1964. Id. The owner sued for damage when
the dry rot was detected four years later. Id.
8. See, eg., Uniroyal Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Agent
Orange was an extremely toxic herbicide used by American military personnel during the
Vietnam War to clear foliage from the Vietnamese countryside. Id. at 1370. Uniroyal manu-
factured and delivered Agent Orange to the United States military from 1966 to 1968 and
discontinued any further activity with the herbicides or their application. Id. Uniroyal
purchased five consecutive CGL policies which covered both the period during the manufac-
ture and sale of Agent Orange, as well as all later periods during which military personnel filed
products liability lawsuits for wrongful death and personal injuries. Id. at 1371. The court
considered the issue of whether the continuous and repeated exposure to Agent Orange over
two years constituted an occurrence under the policy. Id. at 1379-80. The court held that the
single occurrence, resulting in later progressive losses to military personnel, was the manufac-
ture of Agent Orange. Id. at 1383.
9. See, e.g., Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567
(C.D. Cal. 1990). The insured engaged in allegedly infringing activity in the sale of waterbed
mattresses throughout the policy period covered by three different insurers. Id. at 1568. The
court held that the insurance companies owed a duty to defend the insured even though the
infringement claims were not made until years after the last policy had expired. Id. at 1570.
10. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. Apr.) (discussing
whether insurance policy covered injuries at time of manifestation of injury or time of expo-
sure), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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when liability coverage begins,11 they sometimes struggle to determine
when liability coverage ends. 2 Recently, however, courts have used a set
of old and presumably well-established principles of insurance law to fix
the termination of coverage. 3 Such principles as the doctrine of "fortu-
ity" or "known loss" are embodied in the "loss in progress" doctrine. 4
The loss in progress doctrine states that insurance only covers losses that
are unknown or contingent at the time a policy is issued.' s Insurance
carriers raise the loss in progress doctrine as a defense when an insured
claims coverage against its comprehensive general liability (CGL) or first
party insurance policy.' 6 The loss in progress defense asserts that a loss
is not covered because the loss was known or was known to be inevitable
when the policy was issued."
The loss in progress doctrine raises three related issues. First, does
the doctrine apply if the loss was inevitable at the time the policy was
issued or only if the insured knew of the loss at that time? 8 Second, if
the insured's knowledge of a loss at a policy's issuance is required, must
the insured have had actual knowledge of the loss or is the knowledge of
a reasonable insured sufficient?' 9 Third, will the doctrine apply if the
insured merely knows of a loss that may later give rise to a claim against
the insured, or is the insured required to know of existing claims arising
from the loss?20
This Article analyzes the theoretical and practical bases for the loss
11. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). The court in Keene Corp. stated that it must determine when
coverage liability begins because "[n]either the case law nor the terms of the policies lead us
directly to a resolution of the coverage issues raised in this case. Unfortunately, the insurance
companies failed to develop policy language that would directly address the full complexity
... ." Id. at 1041 (footnote omitted); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 474, 477-79 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (applying Michigan law) (discussing competing
theories of liability commencement).
12. Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 831, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44,
46 (1962).
13. E.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 682-83, 798
P.2d 1230, 1235, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392-93 (1990); Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205
Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1393, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280 (1988).
14. This Article will refer to these doctrines collectively as the "loss in progress" doctrine.
15. Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164, 191-92 (D.
Conn. 1984); Home Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1395, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
16. See, eg., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148 (4th
Cir. 1989) (involving first party claim); Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274
Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990) (involving third party claim).
17. "Known or inevitable loss" is a loss that is certain to occur. United States Gypsum
Co., 870 F.2d at 152.
18. See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 94-152 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 153-91 and accompanying text.
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in progress doctrine and explores how it works in practice. This Article
also considers the practical effect of the loss in progress doctrine and
proposes a theory for applying that doctrine: once an insured knows of a
certain loss, although not necessarily the extent of the damages or
number of claims, the insured should no longer be able to obtain insur-
ance for that loss. However, until the time the insured knows of the loss,
the loss should remain contingent and fully insurable. Finally, this Arti-
cle examines the loss in progress doctrine from a national perspective,
and advocates that these principles be applied nationally.21
II. CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE Loss IN PROGRESS DOCTRINE
A. The Loss in Progress Doctrine and the Principle of Contingent or
Unknown Loss
1. Development of the doctrine
All insurance is based on the principle that losses must be unknown
or contingent, rather than certain, at the time a policy is issued.22 This
principle, described as "fortuity," lies at the heart of the loss in progress
doctrine.23 This basic principle of contingent or unknown losses is em-
bodied in statutory and case law,24 as well as in the original Restatement
of Contracts25 and the Second Restatement of Contracts.26
21. Nonetheless, California cases will dominate the discussion of some issues because the
California courts have been particularly active in the development of the loss in progress doc-
trine. For example, a California case, Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 86,
274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990), is the only case in the country to examine the issue of whether notice
to the insured of one loss is notice of other but unrelated losses. See infra notes 192-97 and
accompanying text.
22. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 1.3(a) (1988) (dis-
cussing concept of risk). The authors state:
Risk is an abstract concept .... [S]ince only some portion of the relevant facts that
affect any endeavor can ever be known, predictions about the occurrence of a poten-
tial loss inevitably are based partly on estimates or guesswork. This speculative as-
pect is generally understood as the "element of risk" in an insurance transaction.
Recognition of the risk element is essential to developing techniques for managing
the unknown and unknowable, and the transfer of the element of risk in regard to the
unknown is the characteristic that is almost invariably associated with any conceptu-
alization of insurance.
Id.
23. See generally Stephen A. Cozen & Richard C. Bennett, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclu-
sion, 20 FORUM 222 (1985) ("[E]very 'all risk' contract of insurance contains an unnamed
exclusion-the loss must be fortuitous in nature.").
24. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
25. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a (1932). The Restatement of Contracts
states:
A fortuitous event ... is an event which so far as the parties to the contract are
aware, is dependent on chance. It may be beyond the power of any human being to
bring the event to pass; it may be within the control of third persons; it may even be a
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The concept of fortuity (or unknown or contingent losses)2 7 as a
limit on insurance coverage originated in the area of marine insurance
shortly after World War 1.28 The earliest cases held that a loss was not
fortuitous if a latent defect in property made damage to the property
inevitable, regardless of whether the insured knew of the latent defect.2 9
Those courts stressed that the purpose of the fortuity doctrine was to
prevent fraud in the procurement of insurance policies.30 These decisions
were largely a reaction to insureds seeking marine insurance after they
knew a loss had taken place, or that a loss was inevitable.
31
past event, such as the loss of a vessel, provided that the fact is unknown to the
parties.
Id., cited with approval in Compagnie des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369,
372 (3d Cir. 1983).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTn c'rs § 379 cmt. a (1981). The Second Restate-
ment of Contracts states:
An aleatory contract is one in which at least one party is under a duty that is condi-
tional on the occurrence of an event that, so far as the parties to the contract are
aware, is dependent on chance. Its occurrence may be within the control of third
persons or beyond the control of any person. The event may have already occurred,
as long as that fact is unknown to the parties.
Id.; see Employers Casualty Co. v. Holm, 393 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (holding
insurer liable for water damage due to leaking shower stall even though stall was constructed
without shower pan; damage was fortuitous and, therefore, covered under "all risks of physical
loss" insurance policy because neither party contemplated defect); see also Essex House v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (holding insurer liable
where loss resulted from inherent defect because when policy issued insured was uncertain
when damage, if any, would occur).
27. See Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1395 n.4, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 277, 282 n.4 (1988) (definition of terms); REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a
(1931) (fortuitous losses are dependent on chance insofar as parties to contract are aware).
28. See, ag., Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1000-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (holding
boiler explosion on ship not fortuitous because court could not rule out normal wear and tear
as possible cause, and because test procedure during which boiler exploded was deliberate act);
British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Gaunt, 2 App. Cas. 41 (H.L. 1921) (holding water dam-
age to wool carried on ship's deck fortuitous where damage would have been avoided by ship-
per's proper use of tarpaulins); Hutchins Bros. v. Royal Exch. Assurance Corp., 2 K.B. 398
(K.B. 1911) (holding latent defect of ship's stern frame not recoverable under insurance policy
where defect existed prior to policy issuance).
29. Mellon, 14 F.2d at 1002-03; see also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 678 F. Supp. 138, 141 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 870 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
insured's loss due to collapse of earth beneath gypsum processing plant fortuitous regardless of
insured's knowledge of extensive mining and prior instances of subsidence in area); Chute v.
North River Ins. Co., 214 N.W. 473 (Minn. 1927) (holding opal cracked during shipping as
result of inherent defect not covered under policy that established indemnity against loss or
damage from fortuitous circumstances).
30. United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. at 141 ("The underlying principle of the [for-
tuity] doctrine is public policy: it would encourage fraud to allow recovery on an insurance
loss which is certain to occur.") (citing Compagnie des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
554 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1983) (withholding judgment
on public policy issue)).
31. Mellon, 14 F.2d at 1001-03.
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As the fortuity doctrine spread to all areas of insurance, courts be-
gan to hold that a loss would be covered even if a defect in the property
existing at the time a policy was issued made that loss inevitable, as long
as the insured was unaware of the defect.3 2 Courts expressly relied on
the idea of risk or contingent loss, finding that insurance should only
cover losses that are unknown to the insured at the time a policy is issued
and should not cover losses the insured expected or intended.33 Thus, an
inevitable but unknown loss should be covered.34
The loss in progress doctrine is but another statement of this rule. 5
A loss is in progress if an insured knows about the loss when the policy is
issued.36 If a loss is no longer contingent or unknown, the insurance
carrier is not insuring against a risk, but against a certainty.37
The requirement that a loss be contingent in order to be covered by
insurance is frequently embodied in a statute. In California, the contin-
gent loss principle is expressed in two statutes, sections 22 and 250 of the
California Insurance Code.38 Section 22 states: "Insurance is a contract
whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or
liability arising from a contingent or unknown event."' 39 Section 250 lim-
its insurance coverage to "any contingent or unknown event, whether
past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest,
or create a liability against him [or her]."'
Further, states such as Alabama,41 Louisiana,42 Maryland4 3 and
32. Miller's Mut. Fire.Ins. Co. v. Murrell, 362 S.W.2d 868, 869-70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
33. Intermetal Mexicana v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989)
(applying Pennsylvania law) (holding taking of equipment pursuant to court order was to be
expected and therefore not fortuitous in context of commercial debtor-creditor relationship);
United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. at 142-43 (holding collapse of manufacturing plant
fortuitous where firm had invested 12 million dollars to modernize).
34. United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. at 141-42; Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 362
S.W.2d at 870.
35. Evidently, the term "loss in progress" originated with a California case. Home Ins.
Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1395, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281-82 (1988).
36. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 695 n.7, 798 P.2d
1230, 1244 n.7, 274 Cal. Rptr. 389, 401 n.7 (1990) (holding loss in progress codifies fundamen-
tal principle of insurance law that insurer cannot insure against loss known or apparent to
insured) (citing Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28-29 (lst Cir. 1981));
Home Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1395, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (holding insurance may insure
only against contingent or unknown risks).
37. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Gaunt, 2 App. Cas. 41, 57 (H.L. 1921).
38. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 22, 250 (West 1972).
39. Id. § 22 (emphasis added); see also Intermetal Mexicana v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
866 F.2d 71, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that taking of equipment as result of valid court
order is not fortuitous event).
40. CAL. INS. CODE § 250 (West 1972) (emphasis added).
41. ALA. CODE § 27-1-2(l) (1986) (Insurance is "[a] contract whereby one undertakes to
January 1992]
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New York" also have enacted statutes that require an insurable loss to
be fortuitous. Other states recognize the rule of contingent loss or risk in
case law.45 For example, in Altena v. United Fire & Casualty Co. ,46 the
Iowa Supreme Court concluded that public policy limits insurance to
fortuitous losses only "and generally provides 'no coverage for inten-
tional loss.' "I The court refused to find coverage for a tenant's claims
against her landlord for sexual molestation because, in part, it believed
insurance should cover accidental or unknown losses.4 Coverage for an
intentional loss such as this would be against the public policy of deter-
ring anti-social conduct.49 In Bartholomew v. Appalachian Insurance
Co., the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied Rhode Island law and
found that "[t]he concept of insurance is that the parties, in effect, wager
against the occurrence or non-occurrence of a specified event; the carrier
insures against a risk, not a certainty."51 Other states that recognize or
whose courts imply that a loss must be contingent include: Alabama, 2
indemnify another or pay or provide a specified amount or benefit upon determinable
contingencies.").
42. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:5(1)(a) (West 1959 & Supp. 1991) ("'Insurance' is a con-
tract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay a specified amount upon determina-
ble contingencies.").
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 2 (1957) (Insurance is a "contract whereby one under-
takes to indemnify another or pay or provide a specified or determinable amount or benefit
upon determinable contingencies.").
44. N.Y. INs. LAW § I l01(a)(1) (McKinney 1985) (Insurance contract is "any agreement
or other transaction whereby one party, the 'insurer', is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary
value upon another party, the 'insured' or 'beneficiary', dependent upon the happening of a
fortuitous event.").
45. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
46. 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988).
47. Id. at 487 (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(b),
at 291 (1971)).
48. Id. at 490.
49. Id. at 490-91. Some courts interpret fortuitous as analogous to "accidental." See, e.g.,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. 138, 141 (W.D. Va.
1988), aff'd, 870 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1989). Some courts interpret fortuitous to mean "not
deliberate." Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1001-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
50. 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1980). The insured sold defective car-washing equipment to the
plaintiff who complained about the defects and sued the insured before the insurance policy
was issued. Id. at 28. The First Circuit found that the loss was not insurable because the
occurrence giving rise to liability occurred before the policy took effect. d. at 28-29.
51. Id. at 29.
52. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bonitz Insulation Co., 424 So. 2d 569, 572 (Ala.
1982). Bonitz installed a roof that leaked for several years prior to Bonitz obtaining insurance.
Id. at 571. Because Bonitz had been aware of the leaks before the policy was issued the dam-
age was not unusual or unforeseen and therefore the Alabama Supreme Court concluded no
coverage existed. Id. at 572.
53. Mattis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 454 N.E.2d 1156, 1163 (ill. App. Ct. 1983).
State Farm argued that the defective design of a home made subsequent settlement damage
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Illinois, 3 Louisiana,54 Minnesota," Missouri,56 New Jersey, 7 Ohio,58
Pennsylvania, 9 Texas6° and West Virginia.61
inevitable and thus a loss in progress. Id. at 1164. The Illinois Appellate Court disagreed and
upheld coverage because an inevitable loss may not be the same as a loss in progress. Id. The
court used a proximate cause test which concluded the loss was a combination of natural
conditions and defective design. Id. But for this interaction and contribution of causes the
event may not have been inevitable. Id. It was this point that made the loss fortuitous and,
therefore, an insurable risk. Id.
54. Summers v. Harris, 573 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Louisiana law). The
insured applied for and was issued flood insurance when flood waters were within a few feet of
his house. Id. at 870-7 1. The court concluded that no coverage existed because the loss was in
progress when the policy was issued. Id. at 871-72.
55. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Bartlett, 240 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Minn. 1976), overruled
on other grounds by Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979). The court
held that a contractor's intentional failure to conform to building specifications was not an
occurrence covered by the CGL policy. Id. at 313-14. The court said that a CGL policy is
designed to protect the insured from fortuitous losses, which can include losses due to careless-
ness, but not intentional or reckless acts. Id. at 313.
56. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 180-81 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(applying Missouri law). The insured sought coverage for an environmental clean-up suit,
even though the policies were issued after the lawsuit had been filed. Id. at 162-64. The
district court held that public policy barred coverage for litigation that had started before the
policy went into effect because the lawsuit was a pre-existing claim and there was no unequivo-
cal understanding that such claims were to be covered. Id. at 179-81.
57. Gloucester Township v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 402-03 (D.N.J.
1987) (applying New Jersey law). A federal district court refused to impose coverage on an
insurer that issued a policy after the insured had been sued for environmental damage. Id. at
403.
58. Essex House v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 989 (S.D. Ohio
1975) (applying Ohio law). The carrier contended that at the time the insured applied for its
policy it was inevitable that the brick facing on the insured building would collapse, as it
eventually did. Id. at 987. The court disagreed, noting that even the carrer's own experts
could not testify that at the policy's inception it was certain that a loss would occur. Id. at
985. The court stressed that "a fortuitous event is a loss arising from a defect unknown to the
parties" when they enter into the insurance contract. Id. at 990 (citing Employers Casualty v.
Holm, 393 S.W.2d 363 (rex. Civ. App. 1965)).
59. D'Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 857, 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). The Penn-
sylvania appellate court declined to find coverage for a malpractice action against a doctor. Id.
at 858. The plaintiff had suffered renal failure in 1979, but signs of deterioration in his renal
system had been apparent to the doctor in 1963. Id. The insurance policies at issue were in
effect between 1973 and 1982. Id. The court concluded that "as a matter of policy, the three
appellee insurance companies should not be forced to defend for an injury which was, at least
in embryonic form, reasonably apparent thirteen years before any of them undertook to pro-
vide occurrence coverage." Id. at 862. The court did not want to force the insurer to "insure
against something which has already begun." Id. (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 63 (3d Cir. 1982)).
60. Burch v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838 (rex. 1970). The
Texas Supreme Court held that collision insurance was effective even though the loss occurred
prior to the issuance of the policy, provided that neither the applicant nor the insurer knew of
the loss when the contract was made. Id. at 841.
61. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 151-52 (4th Cir.
1989) (applying Virginia law), aff'g 678 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1988). The insured sought
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Although the principle that insurance can be provided only against
contingent losses has found widespread acceptance, it raises three troub-
ling questions when applied to specific claims. First, is a loss in progress
and thus not covered by a policy, if the loss was merely inevitable when
the insurance contract was signed?62 Or, is the loss in progress only if
the insured has knowledge of the loss when the policy was issued?63 Sec-
ond, if the loss in progress doctrine requires knowledge of the loss at the
time of policy issuance to bar a claim, must the insured have actual
knowledge of the loss or is the knowledge of a reasonable insured suffi-
cient?" . Third, to preclude coverage under the loss in progress doctrine,
must the insurance carrier show the insured merely had knowledge of a
loss that may later give rise to a claim, or must the insured know of
specific claims actually made as a result of the loss?65
2. Inevitable loss versus insured's knowledge of loss
Insurance carriers have argued that a loss is in progress when it is
inevitable that the loss will take place, even if the insured is not aware of
the problem when the policy is issued. The carrier made this argument
in Insurance Co. of North America v. United States Gypsum Co. 66 In that
case, the insured sought benefits under a property insurance policy after
soil subsidence had damaged its gypsum processing plant.6" The carrier
produced expert testimony that soil subsidence was inevitable at the time
the insured applied for the policy,68 but presented no evidence that the
insured was aware that such damage was inevitable.6 9 The district court
rejected the proposition that a loss in progress could be established by
inevitable damage alone, without any knowledge by the insured.
The court in United States Gypsum Co. observed that earlier cases
had held losses caused by inherent defects in insured property were non-
coverage for property loss it sustained after massive sinkholes appeared at one of its manufac-
turing plants. Id. at 151. For over three decades, much smaller sinkholes had occurred on the
property. Id. The Fourth Circuit upheld a trial court judgment that the loss was nonetheless
fortuitous. Id. at 151-53.
62. See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 94-152 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 153-91 and accompanying text.
66. 678 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1988) (applying Virginia law), aff'd, 870 F.2d 148 (4th
Cir. 1989). After the jury had returned a verdict in favor of coverage, the carrier made a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 139. The court denied the motion
because it found the loss was fortuitous. Id. at 144.
67. Id. at 139-40.
68. Id. at 143.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 141-42.
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fortuitous and thus not insurable.71 The court, however, chose to use the
more recent standard for fortuity: as long as the insured is unaware of
the inherent defect, the loss is fortuitous.72 Under this approach, an in-
sured may recover for a loss even if the insured was negligent.73 Even
though the insured's employees were grossly negligent in failing to detect
defects, the loss was fortuitous and thus covered because the carrier
could not prove that the insured had been aware of the inevitable
damage.74
The California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion twenty-
five years earlier in Sabella v. Wisler.75 In Sabella the insurance carrier
argued that its homeowner's policy did not cover a loss caused by a bro-
ken sewage pipe, because subsidence damage to the home was inevitable
at the time the policy was issued.76 The court in Sabella rejected the
insurer's argument that inevitability was the sole standard for a fortui-
tous lOSS.
77
In another case applying California law, Kilroy Industries v. United
Pacific Insurance Co. ,7 Kilroy sought business interruption coverage79
under its property policy when numerous defects in a building it owned
forced its tenants to vacate.80 The carrier contended that the loss was
inevitable and thus not fortuitous because the defects were based on
faulty workmanship done at the time of construction, which was prior to
the issuance of the policy."1 The district court held that the carrier owed
coverage because Kilroy had been unaware of the defects when it applied
71. Id. at 141 (citing Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1926);
British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Gaunt, 2 App. Cas. 41, 57 (H.L. 1921)).
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 144.
75. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
76. Id. at 34, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
77. Id.
"[A]fter any movement of land has occurred it might be said to have been 'inevitable'
with semantic correctness, but such 'inevitability' does not alter the fact that at the
time the contract of insurance was entered into, the event was only a contingency or
risk that might or might not occur within the term of the policy." Moreover, the
breaking of the sewer pipe and consequent induction of quantities of waste water into
the improperly compacted fill may be viewed as an unanticipated external event or
casualty, operating to trigger the greatly accelerated action of possibly inherent vices.
Id. (quoting Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 830, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 45 (1962)).
78. 608 F. Supp. 847 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
79. Business interruption insurance indemnifies a business for lost income during the time
it takes to "restore property damaged by an insured peril to a useful condition." EMMET J.
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 518 (3d ed. 1982).
80. Kilroy Indus., 608 F. Supp. at 849.
81. Id. at 857.
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for the policy.82 It then held that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's loss was
fortuitous because the plaintiff had no knowledge of the defects. 3
These courts are correct in rejecting the inevitable loss concept as a
test for determining if a loss is fortuitous. An inevitability standard en-
courages courts to apply a hindsight test in defining fortuity, when fortu-
ity should be judged by the insured's knowledge at the time a policy
became effective. 4 Further, most insurance underwriters have assumed
that inevitability is not the test for fortuity. Rather, they have written
policies on the assumption that a loss is fortuitous if the insured does not
expect or intend it. 6
The inevitability test, moreover, was developed to make sure that a
marine insurance policy did not cover inherent defects in machinery or
normal wear and tear.8 7 That purpose now can be accomplished by in-
herent defect exclusions, which generally preclude coverage for latent de-
fects and wear and tear.
88
Finally, the purpose of most modem liability insurance policies is to
protect the insured from the consequences of his or her own negligence.8 9
An inevitability standard for fortuity would undercut this goal because,
in many cases, an insured would be denied coverage when he or she was
negligent in failing to discover a loss that was inevitable.9" An actual
knowledge test is preferable because it protects the insured from the con-
sequences of his or her negligence.91
3. The actual knowledge and reasonable insured tests
The loss in progress doctrine raises another fundamental question:
where the loss in progress doctrine requires the insured to be aware of a
loss, must the insured actually know of a loss, or is it sufficient that a
reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would realize that a loss
82. Id. at 858. On that basis, the court granted Kilroy's motion for summary judgment on
the coverage issues. Id. at 861.
83. Id. at 858; CAL. INS. CODE § 250 (West 1972).
84. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. 138, 142 (W.D.
Va. 1988), aff'd, 870 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1989).
85. Id.
86. Compagnie des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1983)
(applying Pennsylvania law); United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. at 142.
87. Redna Marine Corp. v. Poland, 46 F.R.D. 81, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mellon v. Federal
Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
88. See, eg., Kilroy Indus. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 847, 856-57 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
89. See Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. at 142.
90. Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 224 Cal. App, 3d 86, 98-99, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 28 (1990).
91. Id. at 99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
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has taken or will take place? Most courts require actual knowledge by
the insured.92 In addition, a few courts using this actual knowledge stan-
dard also apply an even higher standard of knowledge; these courts re-
quire what appears to be an intent to defraud the carrier before allowing
the loss in progress defense.93
a. actual knowledge
In Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co. 9' the district
court refused to find coverage for an environmental claim under a liabil-
ity policy.95 The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
ordered a toxic waste dump site closed and filed a complaint against the
Township of Gloucester in October of 1980, requesting compensatory
damages and an injunction requiring that the dump be cleaned up.96 In
July 1982, Home Insurance issued its policy to the Township of Glouces-
ter.97 When the insured sought coverage for the complaint under the
policy, Home Insurance declined. 98 The court, which upheld Home's
denial because the township had actual knowledge of the loss before its
application for insurance,99 stated "[o]ne cannot obtain insurance for a
risk that the insured knows has already transpired.'"l" °
In Texas the standard for loss in progress or fortuity is equally
broad. In Burch v. Commonwealth County Mutual Insurance Co.,1°1
damage to plaintiff's automobile occurred during the stipulated policy
period but prior to issuance of the policy.1 2 The court found coverage
because the insured had no knowledge of the loss.10 3 While the court
applied an actual knowledge test, it did not require proof of an intent to
defraud. 1°4
92. Burch v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1970).
93. See, eg., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 153
(4th Cir. 1989), aff'g 678 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1988) (holding policy void if wilful conceal-
ment or fraud can be shown).
94. 668 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.J. 1987).
95. Id. at 402-03.
96. Id. at 396.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 402.
99. Id. at 402-03. Home Insurance, along with a number of other insurers, had moved for
summary judgment. The court granted Home Insurance's motion but denied the motions of
the other insurance carriers. Id. at 403.
100. Id.
101. 450 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1970).
102. Id. at 839. The accident occurred on July 18, 1967, while the policy was issued on
July 19, 1967, providing coverage forward from July 18, 1967. Id.
103. Id. at 841.
104. Id.
[l]t is contrary to public policy for an insurance company, the business of which is
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Conversely, New York courts are likely to use a stricter actual
knowledge standard. In City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Insur-
ance Co. 105 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York
courts would demand proof approaching an intent to defraud before they
would allow coverage to be denied on the basis of a known risk.106 An
intent to defraud requires that the insured actually know of the loss and,
in addition, fraudulently conceal the loss from the insurer when applying
for insurance. 
10 7
The court in City of Johnstown based its decision on two rules:
(1) an insured cannot insure property that he or she knows is damaged
before the policy becomes effective; 108 and (2) an insured cannot recover
when he or she fraudulently conceals or misrepresents material facts to
the insurer when applying for the policy."' 9 The court applied these
rules and found neither fraud nor misrepresentation. 01 The court re-
jected the insurers' argument that coverage for a Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Recovery Act (CERCLA)
action'11 against the city was barred as a known risk.' 12 The court pur-
posely shied away from holding that "a risk, once 'known,' was
uninsurable.""'
Minnesota case law suggests that the Minnesota courts require evi-
dence of fraudulent intent to conceal a loss before they will allow a car-
affected with a public interest, knowingly to assume the burden of a loss that oc-
curred prior to making the contract ....
Most cburts that have considered the question hold that recovery may be had on
a policy antedated to include the time at which a loss occurred provided neither the
applicant nor the insurer knew of the loss when the contract was made .... We
approve and adopt this as a general rule, because in our opinion it is entirely sound as
applied to the facts of this case. Aside from any question of protecting insurance
companies against possible fraud on the part of their customers or agents, we can
think of no reason for holding that the parties may not effectively contract for the
insurer to assume the risk of a loss that may or may not have occurred when the
contract is made.
Id. at 840-41.
105. 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York law). This case was an appeal of an
order granting an insurer's motion for summary judgment, which the Second Circuit reversed.
Id. at 1147.
106. Id. at 1149-50, 1152-53 (holding that expected or intended losses only excluded if they
are not accidental).
107. Id. at 1152-53.
108. Id. at 1153.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) (regulating management and disposal of hazardous
substances).
112. City of Johnstown, 877 F.2d at 1153.
113. Id. The Second Circuit hesitated to recognize the known risk doctrine and thereby
"adopt innovative theories that may distort established state law." Id.
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rier to invoke a loss in progress defense. The insured in Waseca Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Noska 114 negligently caused fires on the properties of
third parties after the expiration of his homeowner's policy."' Shortly
after the fires, Noska discovered that the policy had expired and ap-
proached his insurance agent about renewing the policy." 6 The agent,
unaware that Noska had caused the fires, suggested that he increase the
policy limits for personal liability and Noska agreed." 7 The agent, on
his own initiative, backdated the new policy to the expiration date of the
original policy." 8 Noska had not told the agent about the cause of the
fires because Noska believed that the homeowner's policy covered only
accidents occurring on his own property. 119 The insurance carrier con-
tested the demand that the higher limit be paid.'2 The Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that the carrier could avoid coverage for the
new limit only if it proved fraud.' 2 ' The court found no fraud because
the insured had no knowledge of or intent to backdate the increased limit
on his liability policy.' 22
Waseca Mutual Insurance Co. thus raises the question, actual
knowledge of what? Whereas Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co. required only the insured's actual knowledge of an undisclosed
loss to invoke the loss in progress defense,'23 Waseca Mutual Insurance
Co. required fraudulent intent to conceal the loss-in other words, actual
knowledge of a potentially valid claim.'24 Although in some cases an
insurance carrier may be held to a higher standard of proving the in-
sured's intent to defraud by misrepresentation of a material fact, most
courts do not require more than actual knowledge.
b. reasonable insured standard
Although the loss in progress doctrine has existed for well over
eighty years in the United States, 2 ' it remains largely undeveloped in
114. 331 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1983).
115. Id. at 919, 924.
116. Id. at 924.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 926.
122. Id. at 924-26.
123. 668 F. Supp. 394, 403 (D.N.J. 1987).
124. Waseca Mut Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d at 924; see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying
text.
125. See, e.g., Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
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many states. 126 For example, only California courts have considered the
issue of whether the insured's knowledge of a loss is to be judged by a
reasonable insured standard 127 or by a subjective standard that focuses
on the insured's actual knowledge. 2 ' Moreover, California courts disa-
gree on the answer to this question. An intermediate California appellate
court has held that the insured must actually know of the loss before that
loss will be considered a loss in progress. 129 That court explicitly rejected
the reasonable insured test. 130  By contrast, the California Supreme
Court has implied that an insured can be held to have constructive
knowledge under a reasonable insured test.
13 1
In Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co. 132 the court required the insured
developer Hilbert Chu to have actual knowledge of defects in a condo-
minium project before the carrier could prevail on a loss in progress de-
fense. 133 The claims in dispute involved the carrier's coverage of Chu for
third party claims by homeowners for construction defects. 34 Because
Chu had knowledge of the conditions giving rise to the loss in question
prior to the issuance of the policy, the insurer invoked a loss in progress
defense in its motion for summary judgment.
135
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Canadian
Indemnity, finding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Chu.
136
The California Court of Appeal reversed because a triable issue of fact
existed as to whether Chu had knowledge of the defects when the
Canadian Indemnity policy was issued.' 37 The court of appeal believed
that the subjective, actual knowledge of the insured was the key issue in
applying the loss in progress rule.
138
126. Most courts have made the simple statement that insurance should only cover fortui-
tous losses but have found it largely unnecessary to explain the concept of fortuity in detail.
See, eg., Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1981); Mattis v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 454 N.E.2d 1156, 1163-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
127. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 699, 798 P.2d
1230, 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 404 (1990).
128. Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 96-98, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 26-29
(1990).
129. Id. at 97-99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
130. Id. at 99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
131. Prudential-LMI Commercial In&, 51 Cal. 3d at 699, 798 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr.
at 404.
132. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990).
133. Id. at 96-98, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 26-29.
134. Id. at 90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
135. Id. at 93, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
136, Id.
137. Id. at 103, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
138. Id. at 97-99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
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The court found that coverage was not precluded merely because
Chu should have discovered the defect but negligently failed to do So.
139
Even if Chu was negligent in failing to investigate and discover defects
that would have been investigated by a reasonably prudent person, cover-
age was not barred because "a major purpose of third party liability in-
surance is to protect the insured from claims for negligence."'"
Ignoring the court of appeal's holding in Chu, six weeks later the
California Supreme Court implied that a reasonable insured test was
enough to support a loss in progress defense.14 ' In Prudential-LMI Com-
mercial Insurance v. Superior Court 42 the court determined that the loss
in progress rule required a "manifestation" test as the trigger of coverage
under first party property policies. 43 The court held a loss to be mani-
fest at the time the insured is required to notify the carrier of the loss
under the property policy.'" In adopting a reasonable insured standard
the court stated:
We have previously defined the term "inception of the loss" as
that point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or
should be known to the insured, such that a reasonable insured
would be aware that his notification duty under the policy has
been triggered. We conclude that the definition of "manifesta-
tion of the loss" must be the same.145
In short, if an insured actually becomes aware of damage or injury such
that a reasonable person in the insured's place would be aware of the
loss, then the loss is manifest and the loss in progress rule precludes
coverage. 146
Curiously, the California Supreme Court could have decertified the
139. Id. at 97, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
140. Id. at 99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
141. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230,
274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990). Comparing Chu to Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance may be
like comparing apples and oranges. The California Supreme Court in Prudential-LMI Com-
mercial Insurance expressly limited its holding to first party property damage cases, id. at 679,
798 P.2d at 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, and Chu is a third party liability case, Chu, 224 Cal.
App. 3d at 90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22. In first party claims it is difficult to prove actual knowl-
edge of one's own loss, while in third party claims actual knowledge is easily shown by the
instigation of the claim by the third party.
142. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
143. Id. at 699, 798 P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04. Under the manifestation test,
"insurers whose policy terms commence after initial manifestation of the loss are not responsi-
ble for any potential claims relating to the previously discovered and manifested loss." Id. at
699, 798 P.2d at 1246-47, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
144. Id. at 699, 798 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
145. Id. at 699, 798 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
146. Id.
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Chu case and thereby removed it from publication, indicating its disap-
proval of an actual knowledge test. 47 Yet, the supreme court denied a
petition for review in Chu and allowed the case to remain published.148
Given this apparent disagreement between the California Court of Ap-
peal in Chu and the California Supreme Court in Prudential-LMI Com-
mercial Insurance, the safest course for a carrier applying California law
is to invoke a loss in progress defense only when the insured has actual
knowledge of a loss at the time a policy is issued.,49
c. actual knowledge test is more equitable
The actual knowledge test is supported by the very idea of insur-
ance, particularly liability insurance. Liability insurance protects an in-
sured from the consequences of his or her own failure to act, indifference
or negligence.150 Therefore, if a reasonable insured would have known of
a loss but the actual insured did not because of negligence, the insured
should have coverage. Only then are the insured's reasonable expecta-
tions under a policy met because the insured is protected from his or her
own negligence. 151
In addition, some states have made it a matter of public policy to
construe insurance coverage broadly so as to ensure that third party
claimants are compensated for their injuries.' 52 The loss in progress de-
fense defeats coverage entirely; the claimant receives no compensation.
147. A party seeking review of a decision by a California Court of Appeal can file a petition
for review with the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court rather than
grant the petition can order that the opinion not be published in the official reports. This
action means the case cannot be cited as precedent in any California state court. See CAL. Cr.
R. 976(c)(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991).
The California Supreme Court uses depublication orders to signal its position on an issue
to lower courts. See People v. Dee, 222 Cal. App. 3d 760, 763-64, 272 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210
(1990); Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72
CAL. L. REv. 514, 515 (1984).
148. Petition for Review denied December 12, 1990.
149. The actual knowledge test favors the insured because it upholds coverage even if he or
she was negligent in failing to discover a defect. See Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 224 Cal.
App. 3d 86, 98-99, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 28-29 (1990). By using an actual knowledge standard for
a loss in progress defense, the insurer can avoid the argument that it is advocating a standard
that favors it, and not the insured. The insured may well characterize the reasonable insured
test as pro-insurer because it may not require coverage when the insured was at fault in failing
to detect a loss. See id. at 99-100, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
150. See id. at 99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
151. Redna Marine Corp. v. Poland, 46 F.R.D. 81, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Chu, 224 Cal. App.
3d at 99-100, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
152. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 670-73, 456 P.2d 674, 682-
84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114-16 (1969); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 222 A.2d 282,
289 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
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Because the loss in progress doctrine jeopardizes compensation for vic-
tims of tortfeasors, it should be narrowly interpreted. One way to ac-
complish this goal of protecting victims of tortfeasors and upholding the
insured's reasonable expectations of coverage is to require that the in-
sured have actual knowledge of a loss before that loss becomes
uninsurable.
4. Requiring knowledge of what: Losses that may later give rise to a
claim or actual claims?
The third issue insurers and courts must consider in applying the
loss in progress doctrine is whether the insured is merely required to
know of a loss that may later give rise to a claim against the insured, or
whether the insured must know of claims actually made as a result of the
loss. An intermediate possibility is that the loss in progress doctrine pre-
cludes coverage once the insured knows his or her actions have caused
damage or injury-a loss-but is unaware of any claims against him or
her. 153
a. requiring knowledge of an actual claim
Courts in several states apply the loss in progress doctrine only
when the insured knows of an actual claim made before a policy's issu-
ance.15 4 For example, in Bartholomew v. Appalachian Insurance Co. ,"
the insured, the manufacturer of a defective car-washing machine, was
sued long before the policy was issued." 6 The First Circuit, applying
Rhode Island law, concluded that notice of the claim terminated cover-
age because "[t]he concept of insurance is that the parties, in effect, wa-
ger against the occurrence or non-occurrence of a specified event; the
carrier insures against a risk, not a certainty."' 5 7 The loss in progress
defense succeeded because the insured knew of the defects and of the
lawsuit against it before the policies took effect.' 58
In Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 59 a
153. See, eg., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 151-53
(4th Cir. 1989) (applying Virginia law), aff'g 678 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1988); Essex House
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 988-90 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (applying Ohio
law); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 34, 377 P.2d 889, 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 697 (1963).
This issue as framed arises in third party claims because it assumes someone has made a claim
against the insured.
154. See infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text.
155. 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1981).
156. Id. at 28.
157. Id. at 29.
158. Id. at 28-29.
159. 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1982).
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number of plaintiffs, who later sued Liberty Mutual for sex discrimina-
tion, had filed administrative claims with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) before Appalachian issued its liability policy
to Liberty Mutual."6° The Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law,
concluded that Appalachian did not owe coverage because the loss was
already in progress and no longer fortuitous. 161 The court found Liberty
Mutual must have known of the claim before the policy was issued be-
cause the plaintiffs' administrative complaints to the EEOC preceded the
Appalachian policy's effective date. 162
In United States v. Conservation Chemical Co. 163 the court con-
cluded that no insurable occurrence had taken place under policies effec-
tive after the federal government brought suit against the insured for
reimbursement of cleanup costs. 164 Thus, coverage was denied.1 65 A
similar result was reached in Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co. ,166 in which the court upheld a denial of coverage because the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had filed its complaint against
the insured for reimbursement of cleanup costs before the carrier issued
its policy. 167
Some courts that require an insured to have knowledge of an actual
claim also require the insured to have fraudulent intent before a carrier
can invoke a loss in progress defense.168 These courts believe that only
actual knowledge of a claim will provide convincing evidence of fraud. 169
For example, in Minnesota' 70 and New York17 ' an actual claim is re-
quired as well as proof of an intent to defraud. In City of Johnstown v.
Bankers Standard Insurance Co. 172the Second Circuit observed that "in-
surance will not normally cover damages that are, as a result of legal or
160. Id. at 58-59.
161. Id. at 63.
162. Id. Although the court does not discuss whether Liberty Mutual knew its employees
had complained to the EEOC, the court must have assumed it had such knowledge. Either the
claimants would have sent Liberty Mutual copies of the complaints, or the EEOC would have
notified Liberty Mutual that the complaints had been made.
163. 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (applying Missouri law).
164. Id. at 178-81.
165. Id. at 181, 182-88.
166. 668 F. Supp. 394, 402-03 (D.N.J. 1987).
167. Id. at 403.
168. See, eg., id. at 402-03; Arley v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 183, 187-88 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968); Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917, 924-26
(Minn. 1983).
169. See supra note 168.
170. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d at 924-25.
171. City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1152-53 (2d Cir.
1989) (applying New York law).
172. 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989).
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administrative proceedings, already apparent at the inception of
insurance." 
173
b. requiring knowledge of loss that may later give rise to claim
Other cases do not require knowledge of an actual claim against an
insured, but allow a carrier to invoke the loss in progress defense if the
insured knows of circumstances that may later lead to claims.7 4 For
example, on the day plaintiffs took out a flood insurance policy in Presley
v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n 175 flood waters had already entered the
basement of the plaintiffs' home causing minimal damage, but had not
yet reached the upper floors of the house, where the greatest damage
occurred.1 76 The court found that the loss was in progress because the
insureds knew at the time they applied for the policy that the loss and the
claim for that loss were inevitable.
177
Similarly in Drewett v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 178 the insured's
home had been built above the ground on wooden stilts. By the time the
insured applied for a flood policy, flood water had surrounded the stilts
but had not yet entered the house. 17 9 Because the court believed that the
insured knew that a loss and subsequent claim were inevitable, it upheld
a denial of coverage. 180 It was also concluded that no coverage was owed
because the loss was in progress and no longer contingent in New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 181 The insured, a county
173. Id. at 1153 (citation omitted).
174. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321,
1329 (D. Del. 1988); Presley v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 399 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (E.D.
Mo. 1975).
175. 399 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (applying Missouri law).
176. Id. at 1243.
177. Id. at 1245.
Other courts have pointed out that this [loss in progress] doctrine should be
equally applicable where the loss insured against is in progress at time insurance is
purchased....
In the instant case the plaintiffs' residence was in a continuous state of flood
from March 25th or 26th until sometime in May or June of 1973. The Presleys were
fully aware of their predicament both at the time they applied for insurance and on
the effective date of the policy in question. Under these circumstances recovery must
be denied.
Id. at 1244-45 (emphasis added).
178. 539 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Louisiana law).
179. Id. at 497-98.
180. Id. (affirming district court's holding that no coverage is owed if loss is in progress
when policy takes effect); see also Summers v. Harris, 573 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1978) (fol-
lowing rule in Drewett v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 539 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 1976):
"[W]here a loss already is in progress at the time a policy is issued, the contract of insurance
does not take effect.").
181. 685 F. Supp. 1321, 1330 (D. Del. 1988) (applying Delaware law).
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that operated a landfill, knew at the time it applied for a policy that leaks
from the landfill were polluting groundwater, but it did not know the
cause of the leaks nor the extent of the problem.1 12
The rule in California is unclear. Some California courts go one
step further by permitting a carrier to invoke the loss in progress defense
when the insured has actual knowledge of the loss, even if the insured has
no knowledge of claims before that point."8 3 In Chu v. Canadian Indem-
nity Co. 114 the California Court of Appeal stated that the insured's
knowledge of defects in a condominium project were sufficient to termi-
nate coverage."8 The court never suggested that those defects had to
rise to the level of a claim. However, in Sabella v. Wisler 86 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected an inevitability of loss argument, holding
that any contingent or unknown event may be insured against. In other
words, subjective knowledge of a loss was enough to make a loss no
longer fortuitous, so that denial of coverage was appropriate. 18 7
Where knowledge of a loss is sufficient to satisfy the loss in progress
defense, it remains doubtful whether an insured can avoid the loss in
progress rule when, at the time a policy is issued, the insured knows of
the loss but does not know of the extent of damage or injury surrounding
the loss. 8 Allowing coverage when loss is known, but not its extent, is
unworkable. First, it encourages misrepresentation by insureds in apply-
ing for policies. Provided that the insured gives notice of a loss, the in-
182. Id. at 1324-26. The court stated: "Similarly, in the case at bar, the loss may not have
been a certainty when the policy was issued. However, the process causing the loss began
before the policy was issued, and the County received strong indications that a loss would
occur." Id. at 1329.
183. This conclusion is consistent with § 22 of the California Insurance Code which states
that insurance can only be provided against a contingent or unknown event as opposed to a
contingent or unknown claim. CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1972).
184. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990).
185. Id. at 98-99, 274 Cal Rptr. at 28.
186. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
187. Id. at 34, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697; see also Snapp v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 830, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44,45-46 (1962) (distinguishing defini-
tion of inevitability from contingent event or risk).
188. An example is the following situation: the insured owns a farm containing a number
of underground gasoline tanks. If the insured is aware that the tanks have leaked for a lengthy
period of time, the insured is on notice of a possible loss. Yet, he or she may not know the
extent of pollution damage the leaks have caused, or the extent of possible injuries to his or her
neighbors who may have used polluted groundwater. If the test for loss in progress is that the
insured must know the extent of damage or injuries, the insured could disclose only the leaks
to the insurer and the insurer could still write a policy. If years later homeowners or farmers
near the tanks complained of groundwater pollution, their claims would remain insurable.
See, eg., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 3d
791, 801-02, 245 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (1988) (concluding no coverage because insured knew of
pre-existing defect and was only uncertain as to extent of problem).
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sured will be covered. Insureds are encouraged to mention losses on
their applications but to minimize or disguise those losses. Unfortu-
nately, underwriting personnel for insurance carriers frequently do not
review policy applications carefully to determine whether insureds have
attempted to dismiss or hide the size of possible losses or claims.189 It is
entirely possible that an insured, facing a major loss, could disguise that
loss on the insurance application and persuade an insurer to issue a
policy.
Second, allowing such a narrow interpretation of the loss in progress
doctrine encourages insurers to risk insolvency by providing coverage for
questionable risks.1 90 A carrier in need of premium income may be
tempted to underwrite a dubious risk. Such sloppy underwriting prac-
tices can lead to insurer insolvency. 191 It is doubtful that most courts
will interpret the loss in progress doctrine so narrowly that the insured
will be required to know the extent of damages, so that insureds will be
tempted to tell half-truths on their applications and insurers will be
tempted to underwrite highly questionable risks. The courts eventually
should hold that the loss in progress rule precludes coverage when an
insured has actual notice of a loss, even though the insured is unaware of
the extent of damage or injury caused by the loss.
B. Knowledge of One Loss is Not Necessarily Knowledge of Other
Unrelated Losses
Many progressive loss claims involve only a single injurious process
or loss.' 92 Other claims, however, may involve several losses simultane-
ously. This is a distinct possibility in construction defects cases. A
homeowner suing a developer can allege a number of defects which may
or may not be related. For instance, a homeowner can charge that roofs
leak and stucco was improperly applied allowing water leaks, and that
the home was built on unstable soil leading to soil subsidence damage.
All of these defects can be called faulty construction. Yet knowledge of
one defect may not be considered knowledge of other defects because
189. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir.
1989) (applying Virginia law), aff'g 678 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1988).
190. See, eg., id.; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ambassador Group, 691 F. Supp. 618,
621 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 545 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (App. Div.
1989).
191. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
192. See, eg., Summers v. Harris, 573 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1978) (homeowners brought claim
against insurer for damage caused by one flood in progress for several days); Drewett v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 539 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1976) (insured brought claim against insurer for
damage caused by levee that broke as result of ongoing flood).
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they are defects unrelated by cause. This rule leads to the curious possi-
bility that the loss in progress doctrine may include coverage for some
defects in a construction claim while precluding coverage for others in
the same claim.
193
In Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co. 194 Canadian Indemnity argued
that before it had issued its policy, Chu was on notice of faulty construc-
tion, which it defined as including all defects in a condominium pro-
ject.19 The trial court agreed with this proposition, but the court of
appeal did not.196 The court of appeal believed that each defect had to be
analyzed separately, and that knowledge of one defect did not mean that
the insured had knowledge of other unrelated defects in the project.
1 97
C. Knowledge of the Cause of a Loss
If the loss in progress doctrine precludes coverage when an insured
has actual knowledge of a loss, but not necessarily of the actual claim or
extent of injuries or damages the loss has caused, the court's inquiry is
not over. Some California courts have posed the question of whether the
insured must know the cause of a loss or merely that a loss has taken
place. 
198
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 199
the California Court of Appeal did not analyze the loss in progress doc-
trine extensively, but considered the issue of whether coverage existed
only when a defect first manifested itself to the insured.20° Because mani-
193. For example, in Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr.
20 (1990), Chu, the insured, had detected cracking and uplifting in the pool area of a condo-
minium complex he owned. Id. at 90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22. He had notice of these problems
before the Canadian Indemnity policy became effective and therefore obviously could not
claim coverage for them. Id. The court made it clear, however, that Chu could claim cover-
age under the policy for defects in the foundation, of which he knew nothing before the policy
was issued. Id.
194. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990).
195. Id. at 97, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
196. Id. at 97-98, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
197. Id. at 98, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The court stated:
We are persuaded... [to] reject[] ... the trial court's conclusion that manifes-
tation of one defect demonstrates the project suffers from the generic defect of "faulty
construction," and that later manifestations of distinct and unrelated problems are
merely remanifestations of the same defect of "faulty construction." Instead, each
set of distinct defects must be analyzed separately to determine whether Chu had
knowledge of those defects at the time they sold the units.
Id. at 98, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
198. Id. at 98-99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (implying insured must know cause of loss).
199. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1990). This case was an appeal from a trial
court decision granting Aetna's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed
the order, holding that Aetna did not owe coverage. Id. at 1628-30, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434-36.
200. Id. at 1625-30, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 432-34.
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festation of a defect to the insured is frequently actual notice of a loss,
this case is significant.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. involved the successive coverage of
two insurance companies. Fireman's Fund had sued another insurer,
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., contending that Aetna should have partic-
ipated with Fireman's Fund in the settlement of a construction defects
action.20 1 Fireman's Fund argued that the loss manifested itself during
Aetna's policy term because the cause of the loss became known at that
time.20 2 Fireman's Fund relied on a number of cases holding that the
statute of limitations for personal injury and other actions did not begin
to run until "a person actually discovers, or reasonably should have dis-
covered his injury and its negligent cause. ' 20 3 The court of appeal re-
jected this delayed discovery rule because liability policies involving
allocation of loss among insurers do not involve the same public policy
issues as cases involving actions against fiduciaries, where courts typi-
cally apply the delayed discovery rule to protect fiduciaries from missing
statutes of limitation. 204 Thus, the discovery rule did not merit applica-
tion in a coverage dispute between insurers.20 5
In Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co. 206 the same court of appeal im-
plied that the insured had to know the cause of the loss before the loss in
progress doctrine would preclude coverage.20 7 In March 1982, Canadian
Indemnity issued a policy to a homeowner's association that named Chu
as an additional insured. 0" Substantial soil subsidence damage in the
project eventually led the City of Los Angeles to condemn all but two of
the project's units as unsafe.20 9 In August 1984, after nineteen units had
been sold, Chu discovered that the soil subsidence was caused by design
201. Id. at 1623, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
202. Id. at 1630, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
203. Id. This is the delayed discovery rule. Id. The purpose of the delayed discovery rule
is to protect aggrieved parties who justifiably are ignorant of their right to sue. Id. (citing
Tijsseling v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, 127
Cal. Rptr. 681, 684 (1976)).
204. Id.
205. Id. The court of appeal stated:
[The delayed discovery rule] is most commonly associated with actions against fidu-
ciaries when strict adherence to the date of injury rule for commencing the statute of
limitations would be unfair and would encourage wrongdoers to mislead their fiduci-
ary to delay bringing suit. These policies which support the rule are not effectuated
by applying the delayed discovery rule in this context.
Id. (citation omitted).
206. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990).
207. Id. at 98-99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
208. Id. at 90, 274 Cal. Rtpr. at 22.
209. Id. at 91-92, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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defects in the foundations. 21° The unstable soil and defective design
meant that the foundations could not support the buildings. 211 Had the
foundations been designed properly, the soil's instability would have
made no difference because the foundations would have stabilized the
buildings.
2 12
In early 1982, before he became insured under the Canadian Indem-
nity policy, Chu noticed cracking and uplifting in the complex's pool and
driveways. 213 He learned that the cracks and improperly sealed joints
had allowed moisture into the soil, which then expanded.214 The soils
engineer recommended that the cracks and joints be sealed and that
rebars be installed.2 15 Chu never made a claim for these defects and sold
all the units despite the defects.216
In 1983, however, Chu ified an earlier lawsuit against the architect,
the civil engineers and the soil testing firm for other defects in the pro-
ject.2 17 These defects included leaks in the balconies and windows, leaks
in the plumbing and cracks in the slabs.2 18 Chu alleged negligence in the
design and construction of the foundation and defects in the major con-
crete work.21 9
Canadian Indemnity contended that the loss was in progress when
Chu first began to notice soil subsidence-related defects in early 1982,
before Canadian Indemnity's policy became effective.22 0 Canadian In-
demnity pressed this contention in a motion for summary judgment.221
Chu argued that he did not know the cause of those defects until much
later, and therefore a triable issue of fact regarding his knowledge did
exist.2 22 Chu contended that knowledge of the cause of the defect was
the only proper test for the loss in progress defense.223
The court of appeal agreed with Chu that there was a triable issue of
fact and that the loss had not been in progress in early 1982.224 The
court noted that only two parts of the project, the pool and the driveway,
210. Id.
211. Id. at 92, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 91, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
217. Id. at 90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 91, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
220. Id. at 93, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 101, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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had shown any subsidence damage in that year, and that this damage
only involved cracks in poorly sealed joints.22 Chu argued that
although he was aware of some defects, he was not aware of those that
eventually surfaced after the units were sold.226 The court agreed and
held that knowledge of those defects did not charge Chu with knowledge
of other defects in the project.227
The 1983 lawsuit was a much closer question.228 In that lawsuit
Chu alleged problems with soil subsidence and expansive soils, claiming
that the foundations were unsuitable and were the cause of all of the
structures' instability. 229 The court of appeal found that there was a tria-
ble issue of fact regarding the loss in progress defense because Chu's
knowledge of possible problems with soil subsidence and expansive soils
did not automatically deem him to have knowledge of the defective
foundations.23 °
Chu had noticed that soil subsidence problems existed in the condo-
minium complex and that he might face a possible soil subsidence loss
immediately after the completion of the complex in 198 1.231 Further, by
1983 he had sued the responsible soils engineers, alleging significant soil
subsidence problems.232 Yet, under the court of appeal's rationale, Chu's
225. Id. at 100, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 101, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 30 ("Knowledge of one set of problems does not equate
with knowledge of unrelated defects.").
228. Id. at 102, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
229. Id. at 102-03, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
230. Id. at 102, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31. The court stated:
While the 1983 lawsuit did allege that unspecified "defects" rendered the units
"unsaleable" [sic] and "uninhabitable," Insurer attributes undue significance to this
legal hyperbole. Insurer claims these "admissions" show Chu knew before they sold
the units that the project's defective construction rendered it totally uninhabitable,
and hence the injuries evidenced by the ultimate condemnation were expected and
intended by Chu when they sold the units.
Certainly, the admissions contained in the 1983 lawsuit are admissible against
Chu. While admissible, however, they are not conclusive, and the trier of fact is
entitled to make findings contrary to the allegations of the prior proceedings. Here,
there is room for such contrary findings. While Chu alleged the units were "unsale-
able" [sic] and "uninhabitable" in 1983, there is evidence they may not have under-
stood this condition to continue to prevail in 1984, since the units were in fact sold
and inhabited in 1984. Whatever may have been Chu's knowledge as of 1983, it is
their knowledge of the condition of the units when they were sold that is critical.
Since the evidence indicates the units were being repaired for occupancy at a later
date, a factual question is raised as to whether Chu believed, when they sold the
units, the defects referenced in the 1983 lawsuit could be sufficiently remedied to
remove the problems which had earlier led them to characterize the units as
"uninhabitable."
Id. (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
232. Id. at 91, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
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knowledge of soil subsidence problems was not enough to entirely pre-
clude coverage.233 The court's analysis leads to the conclusion that only
Chu's knowledge of the cause of the subsidence, which did not come
until after the 1983 lawsuit, terminated coverage.
Cases outside of California have rejected the idea that knowledge of
the cause of a loss is the key to the loss in progress doctrine.234 For
example, in Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton
& Cox Corp.235 the insured sought coverage under a property policy for
the complete loss of a cave that collapsed.236 The insured could not
prove the exact cause of the collapse. 237 The carrier argued that no cov-
erage existed unless the insured could prove the cause of the loss and
prove that the cause was fortuitous.238 The Tenth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the insured had to prove only that the loss was fortuitous.
239
The insured did not have to prove the cause of that loss was fortuitous.240
In Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,241 another
case involving a property loss claim, the carrier made the same argument
as did the carrier in Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.: the insured must
prove that the cause of the loss was fortuitous . 42 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected this proposition because other "courts which have considered the
question have rejected the notion that the insured must show the precise
cause of loss to demonstrate fortuity.
'243
To require the insured to prove that the cause of a loss is fortuitous
when a carrier raises the loss in progress defense is dubious at best. In
many cases, an insured will not know the cause of a loss for years, per-
haps even several years into litigation. This was the case in Chu v.
233. Id. at 103, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
234. See, eg., Adams-Arapahoe Joint Sch. Dist. v. Continental Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 772, 775
(1989) (applying Colorado law); Compagnie des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724
F.2d 369, 372 (1983) (applying Pennsylvania law); Empire Underground Storage, Inc. v. Pro-
tective Nat'l Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (1988) (applying Kansas law); Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 678 F. Supp. 138, 141 (1988) (applying Virginia law),
aff'd, 870 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1989); Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
597 F. Supp. 164, 183 (1984) (applying Connecticut law).
235. 579 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Oklahoma law).
236. Id. at 563.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 564 (holding "all risks" policy extends to all risks of fortuitous nature).
240. Id. at 564-65.
241. 632 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying maritime law). Morrison Grain Co. arose out of
the loss of a cargo of bagged urea being shipped from Romania to Mississippi. Id. at 427. The
insured was unable to prove how the loss happened. Id. at 429.
242. Id. at 430; see Texas E. Transmission Corp., 579 F.2d at 564.
243. Morrison Grain Co., 632 F.2d at 431 (referring to Texas E. Transmission Co. v. Marine
Office-Appleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1978)).
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Canadian Indemnity Co. 244 Further, an insured can be aware that he or
she faces a massive loss and hundreds of claims before the insured learns
the cause of the problem. An insured with leaking underground gasoline
tanks may know that he or she is responsible for massive groundwater
pollution, and may face hundreds of lawsuits or claims as a result, before
the insured knows the cause of the leaks. In such a case, the carrier
could raise a successful loss in progress defense because the insured could
not prove that the cause of the loss is fortuitous.24 Knowledge of the
cause of a loss should not be the test for the loss in progress doctrine.
Rather, it should be sufficient that the insured knows he or she faces a
substantial loss, for which he or she is legally responsible.
D. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Loss in Progress and
Fortuity Doctrines
From the insurance carrier's point of view, the loss in progress doc-
trine is a particularly strong defense. First, where the doctrine is codi-
fied, as it is in California,246 Maryland247 and New York,248 it is an
expression of public policy which overrides any contrary language in an
individual insurance policy.24 9 Second, as an expression of public policy
the doctrine applies to all insurance contracts, 250 whether property insur-
ance policies or liability policies based on "occurrence" or "claims
made" forms.21 Third, although the loss in progress doctrine is related
to rules governing contract rescission, a carrier cannot be forced to waive
the loss in progress defense.252
There are similarities between the rules governing rescission of in-
surance contracts and those governing the application of the loss in pro-
244. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 90-92, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 22-24 (1990).
245. See, eg., Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 754 F. Supp. 358, 360-61
(D. Vt. 1990) (leaking storage tanks under gas station caused damage without owner's
knowledge).
246. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 22, 250 (West 1972).
247. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 2 (1957).
248. N.Y. INs. LAw § 1101(a)(1) (McKinney 1985).
249. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1395-96, 253 Cal. Rptr.
277, 281-82 (1988).
250. Presley v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 399 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
251. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 182-84 (W.D. Mo. 1986);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 1627, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 433-34 (1990). An occurrence policy insures against the "occurrence" of covered
injury during the policy term; a "claims made" policy insures against a covered claim being
made during the policy term. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d
1348, 1357-59, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783-84 (1990); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433
So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. 1983).
252. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321, 1328-
29 (D. Del. 1988).
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gress doctrine. Under the rules governing rescission, nearly all states
require an insured to disclose all material facts in applying for an insur-
ance policy. 253 A material fact is one which would lead the insurer either
not to write a policy or to charge a higher premium.25 4 If the insured
does not disclose material facts, the carrier can rescind the policy.2 5 The
carrier need not prove that the insured acted fraudulently, intentionally
or even negligently.25 6
The loss in progress doctrine is based on many of these same princi-
ples. The loss in progress doctrine precludes coverage when an insured
has knowledge of a loss before a policy is issued.257 The insured's obliga-
tion to reveal material facts in applying for coverage requires him to dis-
close this loss or face possible rescission of the policy. 258
Rescission under the loss in progress doctrine differs from typical
insurance contract rescission in one significant sense: a carier can be
forced to waive the typical rescission defense. 259 Failure of the carrier to
conduct a thorough and prompt underwriting investigation before issu-
ing a policy can lead to an implied waiver of its right to rescind when
rescission would otherwise be justified by facts which a reasonably thor-
ough investigation would have revealed. 2 ° In some states this rule has
been codified.261 Unlike rescission, however, no statute requires waiver
of a loss in progress defense in these circumstances. As such, there is a
strong presumption against waiver.262
The great weakness in the loss in progress doctrine is that it applies
253. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 331 (West 1972); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney 1985);
TEXAS INS. CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West 1981).
254. Shapiro v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D. Mass. 1984)
(applying Massachusetts law); Old Line Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d
1600, 1603-06, 281 Cal. Rptr. 15, 17-19 (1991); Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d
125, 127 (N.Y. 1937).
255. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 904, 916, 513 P.2d 353, 360, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 473, 480 (1973).
256. Id.; Hatch v. Woodmen Accident & Life Co., 409 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); Modisette v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 21, 25 (N.M. 1967).
257. Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 96-98, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 26-29
(1990).
258. Thompson, 9 Cal. 3d at 916, 513 P.2d at 360, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
259. Cora Pub, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 619 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 1980) (apply-
ing Florida law); Rutherford v. Prudential Ins. Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 719, 733-34, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 705-06 (1965).
260. Cora Pub, Inc., 619 F.2d at 487; Rutherford, 234 Cal. App. 2d at 733-34,44 Cal. Rptr.
at 705-06. But see New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321,
1328-29 (D. Del. 1988) (applying Delaware law) (holding insurer's failure to conduct thorough
underwriting investigation did not waive its right to rescind based on insured's misrepresenta-
tion, but did make burden of proving misrepresentation more difficult).
261. See, eg., CAL. INS. CODE § 334 (West 1991).
262. New Castle County, 685 F. Supp. at 1328-29.
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only if the insured knows of a loss at the time the policy is issued. If the
insured acquires actual knowledge of a loss after the policy becomes ef-
fective, he or she may yet have coverage.263 The reason for this is basic:
if the insured is unaware of a loss at the time a policy is issued, because
he or she was negligent, the loss remains contingent or unknown. Cover-
age of the loss is consistent with the basic principle of insurance. 2 "
In addition, because insureds have a reasonable expectation they
will have coverage for their negligent conduct, the loss in progress doc-
trine should not preclude coverage when an insured is unaware of a loss
at the time a policy is issued because he or she was negligent in not con-
ducting an investigation. 265  For example, the owner of underground
storage tanks sometimes has the duty under a statute or administrative
regulation to inspect those tanks periodically to determine if they might
have leaks.266 An actual inspection might well reveal leaks. But the in-
sured's failure to inspect, although negligent, means he or she remains
ignorant of the leaks.267 Curiously, the doctrine of loss in progress pre-
cludes coverage for the insured who is vigilant and becomes aware of a
loss, but allows coverage for the insured who is not.268
263. Standard Structural Steel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164, 193 (D. Conn.
1984).
264. See id. (holding insurance contract valid if neither party knew of certain loss when
contract made); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 379 cmt. a (1981); RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a (1932).
265. See Texas E. Transmission Co. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561,
565 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Kansas law); Chu v. Canadian Indem. Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d
86, 98-100, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20, 28-29 (1990).
266. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-36-3(1)(f) (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25283.5(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 479.4 (1989).
267. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321
(D. Del. 1988). The insured, a county government, diligently checked reported leaks from its
landfills, eventually discovering significant groundwater contamination. As a result, the in-
sured lost coverage under several policies issued after it had completed the inspections. Id. at
1330. Had the insured remained ignorant, it might have fared better.
268. Of course, an insured may face other coverage problems if he or she is unaware of a
loss at the time a policy is issued but commits intentional acts later. For example, an insured
may become aware of defects in a product only after a policy becomes effective and yet do
nothing about them. In that event, post-notice conduct is intentional. See, e.g., Hogan v.
Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 560-61, 476 P.2d 825, 828-29, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156-57
(1970).
Most CGL policies do not cover intentional conduct resulting in a loss. Typically, these
policies require that a claim against the insured arise out of an occurrence which is usually
defined as "'an accident, including, continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which re-
sults in bodily injury or property damage.'" Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
196 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 1207, 242 Cal. Rptr. 454, 454 (1987) (emphasis added; emphasis in
original removed) (quoting petitioner's policy). Courts have focused on the word "accident"
in holding that CGL policies do not cover intentional conduct such as fraud, Royal Globe Ins.
Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 534-55, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437-38 (1986), or termina-
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III. CONCLUSION
As the courts are presented with increasing numbers of progressive
loss claims arising out of asbestos, pollution, soil subsidence and similar
cases, the search for the boundaries of insurance coverage will intensify.
Both insureds and insurers will demand that the courts tell them who
must pay for these claims. Many years of insurance coverage may be
involved in each case and litigation over which policies apply will rival
the size and complexity of the liability claims themselves.26 9
The significance of the loss in progress doctrine is not that it tells us
when coverage begins, but that it determines when it ends. Once the loss
in progress doctrine terminates coverage for a particular claim, the in-
sured cannot seek coverage under subsequent policies. Fixing the date
for the loss in progress may mean millions of dollars in coverage or may
force the insured into bankruptcy.
Because the loss in progress doctrine can have such grave conse-
quences, it should be applied carefully. Only the insured's actual knowl-
edge of a loss, as opposed to the constructive knowledge of a reasonable
insured, should terminate coverage. An objective test for knowledge of
the loss could prevent the insured from claiming coverage for his or her
own negligence, when coverage for loss due to one's own negligence is a
primary goal of modem liability insurance. Nothing short of a subjective
test of one's actual knowledge justifies violating an insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage.2 70
An insured should not lose coverage because he or she knows of
tion of an employee, Dyer v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 210 Cal. App. 3d
1540, 1548, 259 Cal. Rptr. 298, 303 (1989); John's Cocktail Lounge, Inc. v. North River Ins.
Co., 563 A.2d 473, 476-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Mary & Alice Ford Nursing
Home Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600-01 (App. Div.), aff'd, 439 N.E.2d 883
(N.Y. 1982).
If, however, a policy's definition of occurrence uses a word other than, or in addition to,
the word "accident," the insured may have a reasonable expectation of coverage for intentional
conduct. Such words can include "event" or "happening." See, e.g., United Pac. Ins. Co. v.
First Interstate Bancsystems, 664 F. Supp. 1390, 1393-94 (D. Mont. 1987) (applying Montana
law); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. McGuire Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1560, 1564-66, 281 Cal. Rptr.
375, 378-79 (1991); First Newton Natl Bank v. General Casualty Co., 426 N.W.2d 618, 625
(Iowa 1988). But see E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 726 P.2d 439,
441-42 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (holding that umbrella policy defining occurence as "an acci-
dent or happening" did not cover intentional discrimination).
269. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). In that case 19 years of policies were at issue. Id. at 1038. The
policies took up several volumes of the record on appeal and 12 law firms were involved in the
appeal. Id. at 1037, 1039 n.6. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981), the court was com-
pelled to construe policies issued over a 23-year period. Id. at 1227-28.
270. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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possible or actual claims made by injured third parties. Requiring the
insured to know of possible or actual claims would encourage potential
insureds to minimize reported losses in applying for insurance. Such a
requirement would also encourage insurers to underwrite questionable
risks. Furthermore, an insured purchases coverage as protection against
the insured's own negligence. This expectation should be protected when
the insured does not know of actual claims due to his or her own
negligence. 271
The insured should also not lose coverage under the loss in progress
defense simply because the insured does not know the extent of damage
or injury resulting from a loss.272 The insured may not learn the effects
of injury or damage until long after lawsuits have been fied or even until
they face trial. Such a narrow reading would encourage insureds to un-
derstate the extent of losses on insurance applications and claim coverage
for undisclosed damage or injury. 273 Additionally, this standard would
result in insurers taking underwriting risks in order to generate premium
revenue without full and complete knowledge of the extent of a potential
risk.
274
Nor should the insured be required to know the cause of a loss. 275
The insured may not discover the cause of a loss until well into trial.
Because an insured can be exposed to liability without knowing the
source of an underlying problem, it is illogical to require that the insured
determine the source in order to defeat a loss in progress claim. A con-
trary result would provide insurers with a windfall with the insurers
knowing full well that their insureds would not be covered although the
insureds had already paid premiums for this coverage. It should be
enough that an insured knows that it faces a substantial loss for which it
may be legally responsible.
271. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
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